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CASE COMMENTS
more accurate than any other evidence of nonpaternity, they will
discover that they have not changed the quantum of proof necessary
to overcome the presumption of legitimacy; blood grouping exclusion
shows impossibility.
Louis C. ROBERTs, III
POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLIC TOILETS
Clandestine police surveillance of public toilets as a means of de-
tecting consensual homosexuality has raised Fourth Amendment prob-
lems concerning the right of privacy and freedom from unreasonable
searches. Public toilets are known to provide an environment for
criminal activities,' and observation by hidden parties provides an
effective means of apprehending the participants. The most recent
decisions have approved systematic and continuous surveillance
through air vents,2 peepholess and even a 2-way mirror,4 with the
result that the privacy apparently offered the public is deceptive.
The result of such decisions is a balancing of the individual's Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
against the exigencies of law enforcement. The problem is far-
reaching: such searches may affect every citizen who uses public
facilities, not just the few who are suspected of violations. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet considered the problem, but has
denied certiorari in 3 cases decided in 1965.5
In Smayda v. United States,6 the 9th Circuit refused to apply the
Fourth Amendment restrictions to peephole observation of a public
toilet in a national park campsite. The manager of the campsite had
received several complaints of homosexual activity in a particular
1"Judges can take judicial knowledge from the case files in their own courts
that public toilets in metropolitan parks, terminals, theaters, department stores and
in similar places, frequented daily by masses of people, are often the locale of vice
of many kinds such as sexual perversion, sale of narcotics, petty thefts, robbery
and assaults." People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492, 494
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
21d. at 494.
SPeople v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
4State ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 176 Ohio St. 78, 197 N.E. 2d 577, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 928 (1964).
uIn addition to the principal case, see People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834,
43 Cal. Rptr. 965 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942 (1965). Cf. State
ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 176 Ohio St. 78, 197 NE.2d 557, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
928 (1964), petition for removal denied, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
0352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
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restroom. The restroom toilets were open to the public, and not
elaborately constructed: board partitions between the 3 stalls were
18 inches above the floor, and the doors had no latches, thereby af-
fording only a minimum of privacy. The manager, with the help of
park police, constructed observation windows, disguised as air vents,
in the ceiling of the restroom. Surveillance was conducted after
11 p.m. on successive Saturdays. After the officers had observed some
40 persons using the facility, they photographed the defendants com-
mitting a criminal homosexual act.7 They were arrested and prose-
cuted for violating the Assimilative Crimes Act; violation of the
pertinent California statute thus became a federal offense.8 The dis-
trict court denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence
procured by the surveillance.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on 2, possibly 3, grounds: (1) the
defendants waived any right of privacy they might have had;9 (2)
the search was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,' ° because it was undertaken upon reasonable cause,"
and (3) possibly because a public toilet is not a "house" as defined
by the Fourth Amendment,' 2 hence there was no search.
The concurring opinion found that there was no "'intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area,' "13 that the actions of the manager
as a private individual were not within the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibitions,14 and that there was no right of privacy per se.15
A strong dissent emphasized that the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to protect the partial right of privacy which a person might
7Cal. Pen. Code § 288a.
818 U.S.C. § 13 (1950). "The Assimilative Crimes Act creates a federal
offense; it refers to the California statutes for its definition and its penalty, but it
does not incorporate the whole criminal and constitutional law of California
We look, then, to the Constitution of the United States, not that of
California." Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 253.
91d. at 255, citing People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676,
678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
'OSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 255.
"Id. at 257. The term "reasonable cause" is used throughout the opinion, ap-
parently in preference to "probable cause." "Reasonable cause has been generally
defined to be such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and
prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that the person is guilty of a crime." People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 412-13, 348
P.2d 577, 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
12Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
13ld. at 257; see Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 Stan.
L. Rev. 318, 329 (1964) (search requires a physical intrusion).
14Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257, citing Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921) (leading case).
15Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 258.
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reasonably expect in a given situation.16 The dissenter rejected the
theory that the defendants waived their rights,17 indicated that cutting
the holes in the ceiling was a physical intrusion,1 8 and concluded
that no similar search had ever been held reasonable.19 Finally, he
termed the search a general exploratory search, "reminiscent of the
abusive writs of assistance and general warrants which motivated the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment." 20
Waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, the first ground of decision,
should not have been inferred from the present fact situation. Federal
and state decisions make it overwhelmingly clear that the right of
freedom from unreasonable searches can be waived by consent,2' but
that the consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given.22 Some courts say they "'indulge every reasonable presump-
tion against waiver'" of fundamental rights.23  People v. Norton24
found a waiver of rights where the act was committed in the open
area of the restroom, but recognized that this waiver would not ex-
tend to acts committed in the stalls. 25 Thus assuming a search, if the
search in the present case is to stand it must do so on the strength of
the determination of its reasonableness.
Smayda's discussion of the reasonableness of the search was similar
to that in the 5 previous toilet surveillance cases which California
appellate courts have decided to date,28 and which are now the basic
'old. at 259. The majority conceded there was a protected right of privacy
in a public toilet. Id. at 257.
171d. at 260.
181d. at 261, citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
IOSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 261, citing Manwaring, supra note
13, at 350 (search merely a substitute for less intrusive methods).
20Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 262.
21See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383, 387 (9th Cit. 1965); Shafer
v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.WV.2d 254, 258-59 (1964); Simmons v. State, 210
Tenn. 443, 360 S.W.2d 10, 11 (1962).
22United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1965); Montana v. Tomich,
332 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Katz, 238 F. Supp. 689,
694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); State v. King, 44 NJ. 346, 209 A.2d 110, 113 (1965).23See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Royster,
204 F. Supp. 760, 763 (N.D. Ohio 1961); People v. Cangione, 33 Misc. 2d 23, 224
N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Queen's County Ct. 1962).
24209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Reptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).25d. at 678.
26See Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1962) (stalls held to offer maximum privacy); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d
469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962) (stalls held to offer maximum privacy);
People v. Hensel, supra note 5 (act done in open area of restroom); People v.
Young, supra note 1 (no partitions); People v. Norton, supra note 6 (no doors).
Of these, the first two, Bielicki and Britt excluded the evidence as an unreasonable
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source of case law on the subject.2 7 All 5 cases have spoken strictly
in Fourth Amendment terms, although there have been suggestions
that due process2 8 and Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 29 consid-
erations may also apply. All 5 cases have approached the problem in
a way common to search and seizure, by considering 3 separate
grounds:3 0 (1) whether the particular activity constituted a search;
(2) whether the place investigated was within the Fourth Amendment
protection of "persons, houses, papers, or effects;" 31 (3) whether the
search was reasonable. In Smayda, the holding of reasonableness was
of paramount importance, and the contentions that there was no
search and that the toilet was not a "house" were only summarily
considered.
(1) Smayda recognized that "both the eye and the ear as well as
the hand, can 'search'. ." 32 This is the general rule,33 and it was
first applied to peephole surveillance in Bielicki v. Superior Court.3 4
The later California decisions,3 5 however, have been prone to take
peephole surveillance cases out of the rule by following the principle
that there is no search in observing that which is open to public
view. 0 Activities which are considered open to public view fall into
invasion of privacy, but the later three refused to follow them by finding that
the acts were open to public view.27 1n addition to United States v. Smayda, see State ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 243
F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965), which adopted the reasoning of the three later
California cases, on similar fact situations. Craft v. State, 181 So. 2d 140 (Miss.
1965), did not cite the California cases, but relied instead on a trespass theory to
admit the evidence obtained by a peephole search.
28Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
Supreme Court Rev. 212, 247-48.
29King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent
Developments and Observations, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 240 (1964).
3063 Colum. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1963).
3 l"[E]very person who enters an enclosed stall in a public toilet is entitled to
believe that, while there, he will have at least the modicum of privacy that its
design affords." Smadya v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
32d. at 255.
33See, e.g., People v. Kramer, 38 Misc. 2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup.
Ct. 1963) (observation of premises from wall held to be a search); People v.
Sheridan, 236 Cal. App. 2d 756, 46 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(searching held to be a function of sight); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290
P.2d 855, 858 (1955) (looking through window held not to be unreasonable
search); Craft v. Mississippi, supra note 24 (peephole view held to be a lawful
search).
34"'[Tlhe term implies some exploratory investigation or an invasion and
quest . . . or seeking out .... ' Bielicki v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at
553-54.35People v. Hensel, supra note 5, People v. Young, supra note 1, People v.
Norton, supra note 24.
36"Merely to observe what is perfectly apparent to any member of the
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2 categories: acts observable in or from an area open to the public
in plain view of police as well as to any member of the public,87 and
acts observable by looking through an open window.88
(2) The contention that the stalls were private places analogous to
houses and therefore covered by the Fourth Amendment was re-
jected in Smayda.39 But that point was unimportant to the outcome
since the court conceded, as did generally the earlier cases, 40 that
there was a protected right of privacy in a public toilet.41 The pro-
tection from unreasonable searches of houses has been extended to
include a taxicab,42 an automobile,43 an office, 44 a store,4 5 and a
temporarily unoccupied dwelling.4 Thus there is no reason why,
upon recognition of a right of privacy in Smayda circumstances, the
toilet could not be considered a house for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. It was unfortunate that the court relied on the theory that
visual observation of a house without a trespass is not a search,47 for
there is a growing awareness of the inadequacies of the trespass test
in this context.48 Peephole surveillance cases are regarded as out of
the "mainstream of search-and-seizure jurisprudence," 49 and it is for
this reason that reliance on analogy to search for tangible objects
is not appropriate in a peephole surveillance case. 50 Silverman v.
general public who might happen on the premises is not a search:' People v.
Young, supra note 1, at 494. The rule is well established, see, e.g., Trujillo v.
United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d
53, 54 (4th Cir. 1958). The extension of this rule to activities in enclosed areas
of toilet stalls does not necessarily follow. No such mechanical approach should
be used. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Nelson v. Hancock, 239
F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965).
37People v. Rayson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Dist. Cr. App.
1961) (observation of shoe shine parlor from street).
3SPeopIe v. Martin, supra note 33 (a leading case).
,3 Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
40See Bielicld v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at 556; Britt v. Superior Court,
supra note 26, at 851.
4lSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
4Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).43Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (car treated as extension of
person).
44Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
45Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (store adjoining house).
46Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752, 754-55 (6th Cir. 1948).47Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
48lnfra note 50.
4OManwaring, supra note 12, at 347.
50Similar analogy was tried in early electronic surveillance cases, such as Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where it was held that there could be
no seizure of a voice which is intangible. King, supra note 29, discusses the dis-
advantages of such techniques, and Beaney, supra note 28, discusses the fight
1966J 427
428 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
United States,51 held that insertion of a spike microphone into a wall
was an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, but stressed
that the intrusion was not to be determined by local trespass law.
Subtle distinctions based on property law were rejected more recently
in Stoner v. California.52
(3) The holding that the search was reasonable is certainly the
significant holding of Smayda. It is here that Smayda differs from
California precedents, which had admitted the evidence acquired by
surveillance by factually distinguishing the Bielicki land mark. 3 The
Smayda holding of reasonableness is in direct conflict with Bielicki,
which held the search unreasonable for lack of probable cause. 54 If
observation of the toilet can be considered a reasonable search, it
would not be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, which applies
only to unreasonable searches and seizures.55 In order to find the
Smayda search reasonable, it is necessary, as the concurring opinion
recognizes, that "a somewhat less strict view of what constitutes ade-
quate proof of probable cause for search must be taken" '56-"some-
what less strict" because focus on a particular suspect is generally
required to constitute reasonable cause.57 Because there is not a par-
ticular suspect, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish a peephole
of privacy in this area. That mechanical analysis fails to consider the nature
of the freedom protected is reflected in Justice Douglas's statement that
My trouble with stare decisis in this field is that it leads us to a matching
of cases on irrelevant facts. An electronic device on the outside wall of a
house is a permissible invasion of privacy according to Goldman v. United
States... while an electronic device that penetrates the wall, as here, is not.
Yet the invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the other.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (concurring opinion).
This was at least tacitly recognized in an earlier case, Brock v United States,
223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955) which held that suggestive questioning through
a window to a person talking in his sleep violated the "right to be left alone."
A visual search may be illegal even without a trespass. People v. Regalado, 224
Cal. App. 2d 586, 36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (observation of hotel
room through peephole in door); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948) (looking through transom of rooming house). Moreover, a trespass may
not of itself render a search illegal. United States v. Young, 322 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.
1963) (trespass on grounds surrounding building is not per se an illegal search);
"[A] simple trespass without more does not invalidate a subsequent seizure."
United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
51365 U.S. 505 (1961).
52376 U.S. 483 (1964).
63Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 253.
54lbid.; Bielicki v. Superior Court, supra note 26.
55See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd 362 U.S.
217 (1960).
5 6Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 259.
57ld. at 257.
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surveillance from a general exploratory search for evidence. The
usual rule is that no such general exploratory search can be justified
even with a warrant.5 8 This rule is the most significant obstacle
to sustaining the reasonableness of a toilet surveillance. Since the sole
purpose of the general surveillance is to obtain evidence of guilt,
both Bielicki v. Superior Court59 and Britt v. Superior CourtO0 con-
sidered such surveillance a general exploratory search. Smayda at-
tempted a distinction, saying that other exploratory searches involved
"physical invasion of private premises, an arrest, and then a general
exploratory search of the premises for evidence of crime." 61 Such a
distinction seems to overlook the obvious, for persons and effects
may be searched without an invasion of premises and without an
arrest; and premises may be searched without a physical invasion.
6 2
More significant is Smayda's holding that
when, as here, the police have reasonable cause to believe that
public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and
when, as here, they confine their activities to the times when such
crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute
clandestine surveillance.. . .The public interest in its privacy,
we think, must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public in-
terest in law enforcement.63
This reemphasizes the importance of the holding of the reasonableness
of the search, and makes it even more apparent that the validity of
the decision is highly, even entirely, dependent on the wisdom of the
determination of reasonableness.
There are doubts as to the wisdom of the determination that, even
under the restrictive circumstances just mentioned, a peephole sur-
veillance should be allowed to compromise the right of privacyf4
But there is authority indicating that there are situations where the
58See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); "Whatever
reason law enforcement officials may have to believe that illegal activities are
being conducted within a house, they may not, without a warrant, invade the
house for the purpose of searching for and seizing evidence of criminal acts.",
United States v. Young, supra note 50, at 444; Drayton v. United States, 205
F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1953) (fact premises had an unsavory reputation did not
authorize a general search); United States v. Bayley, 240 F. Supp. 649, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) "[slearches for and seizures of mere evidence are always un-
reasonable"; 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 410, at 1055 (5th ed. 1956).
59Supra note 26, at 554.
6oSupra note 26, at 850.
OlSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.62Cases cited note 50, supra.
63Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
64lnfra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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usual standards of reasonableness can be relaxed.65 The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly and emphatically stated that "there is
no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances." 16 This was recently
reemphasized in Ker v. California,67 which was taken on certiorari
after Mapp v. Obio68 for the express purpose of further explication
of "the standard by which state searches and seizures must be eval-
uated." 69 Ker stated that the "standards of reasonableness . . . are
not susceptible of procrustean application." 70 This is very much in
accord with the abovementioned disapproval of the use of improper
analogy, such as trespass, in search and seizure cases.7' The test of
reasonableness of a search is usually stated in broad terms, typically,
whether the thing done, in sum of its form, scope, nature, inci-
dents and effect, impresses as being fundamentally unfair or un-
reasonable in the specific situation when the immediate end sought
is considered against the private right affected.72
The determination of reasonableness involves a balancing of interests,
73
or an examination of the total fact situation with regard to the con-
stitutional right of privacy.74 Reasonableness has been called the
fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment.75
Despite such broad views of what constitutes reasonableness, Smay-
da is still an extension of traditional concepts. There are several ways
in which the more traditional concepts may be asserted in a case of
this type: Courts have held that reasonableness depends on the ex-
istence of probable cause,76 or even on whether there was a trespass.
77
GuSee Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (a leading case holding
that where impracticable a warrant is not necessary for search of an automobile);
Comment, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 221, 222 (1965).66Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). See Rios
v. United States, supra note 42, at 255; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US.
56, 63 (1950).
07374 U.S. 23 (1963).
68367 U.S. 643 (1961).
09Ker v. California, supra note 67, at 24.
7id. at 33.
"'See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
72United States v. Cook, 213 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
73See People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 177, 255 N.YS.2d 833,
835 (1964).
"t4State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392, 396 (1962).75State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964).
76See, e.g., United States ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132, 136
(D. Conn. 1964); United States v. O'Lear., 201 F. Supp. 926, 929 (E.D. Tenn.
1961).
77See Jones v. United States, 339 F.2d 419, 420 (5th Cir. 1964) (equates physical
intrusion with encroachment).
CASE COMMENTS
There are suggestions that the seriousness of the crime is to be con-
sidered, with greater constitutional scrutiny afforded methods of
search in less serious crimes such as gambling or obscenity, and less
exacting standards in more serious crimes such as burglary, robbery,
or crimes involving a dangerous weapon. 78 Consensual homosexuality
would presumably fall into the category of- lesser crimes, so that it
would be inappropriate to justify the surveillance by reference to
the comparatively relaxed standards of reasonableness encountered in
dealing with dangerous crimes. Also, it is frequently recognized that a
warrantless search may be reasonable, hence justified, in exceptional
circumstances.79 But it would require a substantial extension to apply
the exceptional circumstances principle to toilet surveillance cases. For
the exceptional circumstances principle has been applied rarely, and
if at all,80 to the necessitous circumstances of some military searches,"
or more traditionally to instances of a crime committed in the offi-
cer's presence,82 or to threatened imminent destruction of evidence.a
Even if such a search might be considered reasonable, the wisdom
of such a determination is still doubtful. Most courts would find it
distasteful that such a search entails widespread observation of inno-
cent parties.8 4 There is a basic objection to any systematic clan-
destine surveillance where privacy is apparently offered. Such sur-
veillance violates the recognized right to be left alone,as and is prob-
ably a tortious invasion of privacy.88 There is only a fine line between
it and the drilling of peepholes in every door of a hotel, a practice
condemned in People v. Regalado.87 There is opinion to the effect
78See, e.g., Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1962); 63
Colum. L. Rev. 955, 958 (1963).
79See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); McDonald v.
United States, supra note 50, at 456.
80"It is of interest that no federal or New Jersey appellate decision has been
found actually sustaining a search without a warrant, not incidental to an arrest,
on the express basis of the exceptional circumstances rule." State v. Naturile, 83
N.J. Super. 563, 200 A.2d 617, 619 (Super. Ct. 1964). But see Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (abortion case where likelihood of death
justified an otherwise unlawful entry).
8'United States v. Grisby, 335 F2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964).
82United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
83See Chapman v. United States, supra note 21.
84See, e.g, Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
85See United States v. Brock, supra note 50.
8sProsser defines the tort, as pertinent here, as an "intrusion upon the plain-
tiff's physical solitude or seclusion" which extends beyond physical intrusion to
eavesdropping and even to peering in the windows of a home. Prosser, Torts
§ 112, at 833 (3d ed. 1964).87Supra note 50.
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